Titre : | Global Financial Networked Governance : The Power of the Financial Stability Board and its Limits | Type de document : | texte imprimé | Auteurs : | Peter Knaack, Auteur | Editeur : | Routledge | Année de publication : | 2023 | Collection : | Global Political Economy | Importance : | 214p | Format : | 24cm | ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-1-03-226807-1 | Prix : | 11 008,00 | Langues : | Anglais | Tags : | The Financial Stability Board, Government Network, Financial institutions,International finance. | Résumé : | Global Financial Networked Governance provides a careful analysis of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the standard-setters under its umbrella to show how such government networks harness the power of public reputation to herd their members into compliance.
The FSB’s track record in coordinating global financial regulatory reform is uneven. Some items on its agenda have seen the rapid evolution of globally coordinated regulatory standards and their implementation by all member states, sometimes even ahead of the stipulated timelines. In contrast, other initiatives have stalled at different stages of the policymaking process, global coordination is lacking, deadlines have been missed, and it is currently unclear when the post-crisis financial reform project will come to completion, if ever. In this book, the author asks the question: why has the FSB succeeded in some areas of its global financial regulatory coordination work and not in others? The book traces the global policymaking process in three major issue areas: banking regulation (Basel III), over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and ending too-big-to-fail. Through a combination of careful process tracing and rigorous testing against alternative explanations, it challenges the existing literature by revealing that the institutional pathway of policymaking is the main predictor of FSB progress. It shows that government networks on their own have succeeded in implementing globally coherent safety standards. In contrast, legislation and legislators in key G20 countries have limited the power and effectiveness of the FSB. The author analyzes the causes and effects of this phenomenon and suggests a novel institutional solution to the effectiveness-legitimacy dilemma that global governance forums face, combining the advantages of functional specialization and electoral accountability.
This book will be of great interest to graduate students; academics working at the intersection of economics, political science, and international law; students of the FSB in particular; and policymakers in global economic governance. | Note de contenu : | Acknowledgments
1 The Financial Stability Board – A Mixed Track Record at the Center of Global Financial Governance
The Birth of the Financial Stability Board
The Track Record of the FSB
Overall Argument
The FSB as a Government Network
Contestation Within the FSB and the Power of Reputation
Legislative Reluctance
Method
Outline of the Book
2 The Power of a Government Network – and its Limits
Globalization: From Hierarchy to Network
The Rise of the Regulatory State
The Rise of Government Networks
Legislators – Falling Behind
Competing Explanations
Global Governance of Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence
3 Timely Implementation and Mock Compliance With Basel III
Government Network
Alternative Explanations
4 OTC Derivatives
The Puzzle
Government Network
Trans-Atlantic Coordination Failure
Regulatory Fragmentation in the United States
Fragmentation in Trade Reporting
Alternative Explanations
Conclusion
5 The Never-Ending Too-Big-To-Fail Story
The Puzzle
Government Network
Bail-in
Crisis-Management Groups and Cooperation Agreements
Temporary Stay on Early Termination Rights
Alternative Explanations
PLAC, GLAC, TLAC – The Sound of Basel
Conclusion
6 Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Government Networks
Why Global Financial Governance?
Effectiveness
Legitimacy
Democratic Legitimacy at the International Level?
Stakeholder Inclusion
Deliberative Equality
Expert Councils – A Proposal
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
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Global Financial Networked Governance : The Power of the Financial Stability Board and its Limits [texte imprimé] / Peter Knaack, Auteur . - New york : Routledge, 2023 . - 214p ; 24cm. - ( Global Political Economy) . ISBN : 978-1-03-226807-1 : 11 008,00 Langues : Anglais Tags : | The Financial Stability Board, Government Network, Financial institutions,International finance. | Résumé : | Global Financial Networked Governance provides a careful analysis of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the standard-setters under its umbrella to show how such government networks harness the power of public reputation to herd their members into compliance.
The FSB’s track record in coordinating global financial regulatory reform is uneven. Some items on its agenda have seen the rapid evolution of globally coordinated regulatory standards and their implementation by all member states, sometimes even ahead of the stipulated timelines. In contrast, other initiatives have stalled at different stages of the policymaking process, global coordination is lacking, deadlines have been missed, and it is currently unclear when the post-crisis financial reform project will come to completion, if ever. In this book, the author asks the question: why has the FSB succeeded in some areas of its global financial regulatory coordination work and not in others? The book traces the global policymaking process in three major issue areas: banking regulation (Basel III), over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and ending too-big-to-fail. Through a combination of careful process tracing and rigorous testing against alternative explanations, it challenges the existing literature by revealing that the institutional pathway of policymaking is the main predictor of FSB progress. It shows that government networks on their own have succeeded in implementing globally coherent safety standards. In contrast, legislation and legislators in key G20 countries have limited the power and effectiveness of the FSB. The author analyzes the causes and effects of this phenomenon and suggests a novel institutional solution to the effectiveness-legitimacy dilemma that global governance forums face, combining the advantages of functional specialization and electoral accountability.
This book will be of great interest to graduate students; academics working at the intersection of economics, political science, and international law; students of the FSB in particular; and policymakers in global economic governance. | Note de contenu : | Acknowledgments
1 The Financial Stability Board – A Mixed Track Record at the Center of Global Financial Governance
The Birth of the Financial Stability Board
The Track Record of the FSB
Overall Argument
The FSB as a Government Network
Contestation Within the FSB and the Power of Reputation
Legislative Reluctance
Method
Outline of the Book
2 The Power of a Government Network – and its Limits
Globalization: From Hierarchy to Network
The Rise of the Regulatory State
The Rise of Government Networks
Legislators – Falling Behind
Competing Explanations
Global Governance of Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence
3 Timely Implementation and Mock Compliance With Basel III
Government Network
Alternative Explanations
4 OTC Derivatives
The Puzzle
Government Network
Trans-Atlantic Coordination Failure
Regulatory Fragmentation in the United States
Fragmentation in Trade Reporting
Alternative Explanations
Conclusion
5 The Never-Ending Too-Big-To-Fail Story
The Puzzle
Government Network
Bail-in
Crisis-Management Groups and Cooperation Agreements
Temporary Stay on Early Termination Rights
Alternative Explanations
PLAC, GLAC, TLAC – The Sound of Basel
Conclusion
6 Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Government Networks
Why Global Financial Governance?
Effectiveness
Legitimacy
Democratic Legitimacy at the International Level?
Stakeholder Inclusion
Deliberative Equality
Expert Councils – A Proposal
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
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